Builds on the working paper: If I Don’t Trust Your Preferences, I Won’t Follow Mine: Preference Stability, Beliefs, and Strategic Choice
- we don’t have good predictions for one-shot public-good situations (few models are calibrated to even allow for such predictions). This paper looks at whether Nash-equilibrium predicts aggregate behaviour out-of-sample when based on empirical conditional-contributions measurements (prediction from Wolff, 2017). Answer: yes, pretty well!
- even better when we provide conditions close to the mutual-knowledge-of-preferences assumption (by disclosing interaction partners‘ conditional-contribution vectors [in a deception-free way]). It even predicts behaviour of those who don’t believe in the displayed preferences, and of those who show stochastic preferences.
- in case of multiple equilibria, Fehr & Schmidt’s (1999) invoking of Pareto-dominance gets empirical support, even though about 1/5 of the population (each) also select the average- and the lowest-contribution equilibria.
